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The Bush Doctrine: Making or Breaking
Customary International Law?
By JOEL R. PAUL*

Introduction
Proponents of the Bush Doctrine of anticipatory self-defense or
preemptive use of force argue either that it is consistent with
customary international law or, in the alternative, that it represents an
emerging state practice that may crystallize into a new rule of
customary international law. In other words, even if we agree with
Professor Franck that the Bush Doctrine violates international law,
does it also transform it?
The chief function of the international legal system is to
minimize violence. In the absence of a specific Security Council
authorization to use force, the United Nations Charter (hereinafter
Charter) permits states to resort to force only in self-defense. Selfdefense is permissible as a means of curtailing violence; that is, a state
can act in self-defense in order to deter or prevent an imminent
attack. All acts of self-defense are, in this sense, preemptive,
preventive and anticipatory. What distinguishes conventional acts of
self-defense from preemption, prevention or anticipatory self-defense
is only a question of timing and evidence.
That observation does not mean that every use of force
undertaken in anticipation of some future attack is permissible as selfdefense. If my neighbor throws a punch in my direction, surely I have
a right to defend myself. But if my neighbor has a nasty five-year-old
who could grow into a mean-tempered teen, I hardly have the right to
break the child's arm before he can threaten me.
Any doctrine that fails to distinguish among the probabilities of
some future attack is incompatible with the international legal order.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
grateful to our librarian Vincent Moyer for his research assistance.
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Two of the fundamental requirements of any international legal
doctrine are that it must first be applicable to all parties, and second,
it cannot derogate from the essential state structure of the
international legal system. You cannot have a rule of law in our
present international legal system that denies state sovereignty. It
may modify or qualify state sovereignty but it cannot eviscerate it.
If the Bush Doctrine is read as a non-reciprocal rule-that the
U.S. alone may prevent war by attacking other states that are
developing weapons of mass destruction-then it is not a doctrine of
law, it is simply a unilateral assertion of power.
Conversely, if the Bush Doctrine is read as conferring on all
states the authority to act to prevent war, then every state's territorial
sovereignty is threatened, and no practical limit on violence is
retained: Pakistan is as justified as India in attacking its neighbor to
prevent a possible future use of nuclear weapons; Iran, Iraq, Israel
and Syria have license to attack each other to prevent the acquisition
of weapons technologies. Such a rule would be wholly incompatible
with the fundamental principle of minimizing violence. For the Bush
Doctrine to be accepted as law, its proponents must articulate some
limiting principle other than non-reciprocity.
Was the Bush Doctrine as Applied to the Iraq War Authorized
by the Security Council?
To evaluate whether the Bush Doctrine is consistent with
international law, it is useful to consider the doctrine's application in
justifying the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the subsequent
occupation and reconstruction. For the reasons that follow, the U.S.
invasion could not be justified under the Charter, and the legal
justification for the U.S. military action must, instead, rely upon some
customary international legal norm.
Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids the threat or use of force
"against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations."1 Significantly, this prohibition on the use of force is
contained in Chapter I of the Charter setting forth the central
"Purposes and Principles" of the organization. Chapter I informs that
the whole Charter, and every article must be read in a way consistent
with Article 2(4).

1. U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2, para. 4.
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Under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council has
authority to determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression, and to authorize measures,
including force, to restore the peace.2 Pursuant to Chapter VII the
Security Council adopted Resolution 660 in 1990 authorizing the use
of military force against Iraq to compel Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait.3 After hostilities ceased in 1991, the Security Council
adopted Resolution 678, laying down the conditions for a cease fire.4

Resolution 678 required Iraq to comply with U.N. weapons
inspections. Arguably, the effect of Resolution 678 was to suspend
Security Council Resolution 660 subject to Iraq's compliance with
weapons inspections. Iraq, of course, failed to cooperate with the
weapons inspections, and the Security Council responded in 2002 by
adopting Resolution 1441.! Resolution 1441 provided that Iraq afford
immediate and unconditional access to the U.N. inspectors.
Resolution 1441 found that Iraq had breached its obligations under
Security Council Resolution 678. It provided that if the U.N.
inspectors found any failure to comply with the requirements of 1441,
the Council would immediately convene to consider the situation.
Resolution 1441 warned Iraq that it would face serious consequences,
if it failed to comply fully.
One could argue that by finding Iraq in breach of Resolution 678,
Resolution 1441 withdrew the terms of the cease fire leaving in place
Resolution 660 authorizing military force against Iraq. In other
words, Iraq's failure to comply with the terms of Resolution 678
meant that the United States could revert back to the residual
authority of Resolution 660 to justify its invasion.
That legalistic argument is simply too clever by half. Even the
British Government rejected that argument. It would require us to
overlook the public statements of the Security Council members as to
the meaning of 1441 at the time of its passage. Prior to the adoption
of 1441, the United States and Britain had tried to persuade the
Security Council to authorize military force against Iraq to find and
destroy weapons of mass destruction. Why did the United States and
Britain lobby strenuously for authorization to attack Iraq, if the
Security Council had previously authorized military action? The
2.
3.
4.
5.

U.N. CHARTER art. 39, art. 42.
S.C. Res. 660, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002).
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other permanent members of the Security Council, France, China and
Russia, objected to authorizing military actions. Indeed, these
governments vigorously asserted that the U.N. inspectors needed
more time to do their work on the ground in Iraq. The language of
1441 was a compromise that gave the inspectors more time to search
for weapons of mass destruction. All of the permanent members of
the Security Council agreed expressly that if the inspectors were
unsuccessful, the Security Council would meet to discuss other
measures, but that there would be no "automatic" authorization for
military force. The U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte made this
agreement explicit at the time the Council adopted 1441. He stated
emphatically that the resolution "contains no6 hidden triggers and no
automaticity with respect to the use of force.",
One could argue that the U.S. Ambassador was acting in bad
faith or was mis-informed about the intentions of the U.S.
Government. Should the U.S. Government be bound by false or
misleading statements made by the U.N. Representative in order to
induce other states to support a Security Council Resolution?
Arguably, it should be the intent of the government, and not their
representative that governs the interpretation of security council
resolutions.
If the United States disavowed the word of its own
representative and asserted the automaticity of 1441, it would
undermine its credibility in any future vote. Moreover, it is clear that
the U.S. intent would have been inconsistent with the stated
intentions of all other Council members. A rule of interpretation that
says that any Council member can change the meaning of a Council
resolution merely by intending the opposite of what they say, is an
invitation to void the work of the Security Council. If there was no
meeting of the minds among Council members as to what was
intended by 1441, then 1441 had no effect, and the prohibition on the
use of force contained in Article 2(4) remains operational.
Finally, let us assume arguendo that all the Council members,
contrary to their stated positions, actually intended to resurrect
Resolution 660 from a decade in desuetude. Resolution 660 required
Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait. It did not require Iraq to
submit to weapons inspections. More to the point, Resolution 660 did
not authorize the United States to remove the Government of Iraq,
6. Julia Preston, Security Council Votes; 15-0, for Tough Iraq Resolution, N.Y.
TIMES. Nov. 9, 2002, at Al.
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occupy the country, seize control of the oil fields, and impose a new
form of government. Resolution 660 simply did not cover the
circumstances of the U.S. invasion.
In sum, there is no evidence that the Security Council authorized
the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. Without the Security
Council's authorization, the only exception permitting the use of
force under the Charter is contained in Article 51, which provides
that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security
In order to argue that the Bush Doctrine (as applied in the Iraq
War) is consistent with the Charter, it is necessary to assert either that
the "inherent right" of self-defense under customary international law
includes the right to use force before an armed attack occurs, or that
Article 51 has been amended by subsequent developments in
customary international law.

Is the Bush Doctrine Consistent with the "Inherent Right" of
Self-Defense as Defined by Customary International Law?
Proponents of the Bush Doctrine need to argue first that under
customary international law there is an inherent right to anticipatory
self-defense. Customary international law derives from customary
practice among states accepted as law. Customary international law is
how one state can reasonably expect another state to behave.
Proponents of the Bush Doctrine rely primarily on the famous case of
The Caroline for the proposition that customary international law
recognizes an inherent right of anticipatory self-defense.8 A close
examination of the facts of The Caroline, however, calls into question
that proposition.
In 1837 a group of Canadians led an insurrection against British
colonial rule. Sympathetic U.S. volunteers on the New York side of
the Niagara River joined with the Canadian insurgents.
On
December 13 armed U.S. nationals invaded and seized Navy Island in

7. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
8. David E. Sanger, Beating Them to the Prewar,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at
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Upper Canada in violation of British sovereignty and U.S. neutrality
laws. The leader of the American insurgents established a provisional
revolutionary government there for the purposes of overthrowing
British rule. The Americans repeatedly fired on British ships passing
the island from December 13 through December 29. It is unclear
whether any ships were actually hit, but certainly the Americans
intended to destroy these vessels. Over a fortnight additional
supplies and U.S. insurgents were ferried to the island on board a
number of ships, including The Caroline, a small steamer flying a U.S.
flag. Eventually, over 1,000 well-armed Americans were encamped
on British territory. 9
The British Ambassador later referred to the "piratical
character" of The Caroline, ° and it is fair to say that the U.S.
Government today would probably describe these insurgents as
"illegal combatants" or "terrorists." Indeed, the U.S. Government
sent the U.S. Marshal to arrest the American insurgents, but he was
unable to prevent the continuing armed attacks on British territory
and navy vessels.
I .
On December 29, 1837, U.S. insurgents camped on the U.S. side
of the Niagara River fired at British troops stationed on the Canadian
side. That same day The Caroline landed at Navy Island with
additional men and supplies including a large cannon and
ammunition.
That night, in response to the armed invasion and occupation of
British territory, the repeated attacks by U.S. insurgents stationed on
both sides of the River, and the ongoing shipments of armed men and
ammunition from the United States to Canada, British troops
boarded The Caroline while it was docked on the U.S. side of the
River. All the Americans on board fled. The British burned the
vessel and set it adrift over the falls. In the melee, two U.S. nationals
were shot dead while fleeing the vessel. The British specifically
targeted only The Caroline in order to prevent more reinforcements
and supplies from reaching the rebels occupying Navy Island.1"
In response to this unfortunate incident, the U.S. Secretary of
State (then John Forsyth and later Daniel Webster) complained to
the British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston. The matter remained
unresolved until 1841 when a British national, Alexander McLeod,
9. R.Y. Jennings, The Carolineand McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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was arrested in New York State on charges of murder for his
participation in the raid on The Caroline. At this point, the British
Foreign Secretary demanded the release of McLeod and sent Lord
Ashburton to Washington as a minister plenipotentiary with
Lord Ashburton took
instructions to resolve the dispute.
responsibility for the attack, but argued that the British acted in selfdefense. (McLeod disputed that he had participated and was
subsequently acquitted of the charges.)
Secretary Webster replied to Lord Ashburton that for the British
to establish that they had acted in self-defense, they must show the
necessity of that self-defense was "instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." Further,
Webster wrote that "nothing unreasonable or excessive" may be done
and force "must be limited by that necessity" of self-defense. 2
The Caroline was not a case of anticipatory self-defense or the
preventive use of force. When the British Ambassador Henry Fox
wrote to the British Foreign Secretary in 1839 suggesting that the
British actions had been "absolutely necessary as a measure of
precaution for the future and not as a measure of retaliation for the
past," the Foreign Secretary disagreed. , Instead, the Foreign
Secretary insisted that the attack was justified as a measure of "selfdefense and self-preservation," and that is how the British and the
Americans understood the British legal argument. 13 The British had
retaliated against an immediate prior series of armed attacks and the
continuing illegal occupation of British territory. It was not merely
speculative that the Americans might threaten Canada. The British
knew to a certainty that if The Caroline was not destroyed, it would
continue to ferry armed insurgents and supplies into Canada for the
purposes of fomenting a general insurrection. The U.S. Government
acknowledged that it had tried and failed to stop the insurgents. The
U.S. Government did not deny that the armed attack violated British
of the U.S. insurgents justified some
sovereignty. Surely, the actions
4
sort of response by Britain.

12. Id. at 82-99.
13. Id. at 87.
14. The U.S. Government in 1845 could hardly deny that continual armed attacks
across a border with Canada, as well as seizing and occupying Canadian territory,
justified British self-defense measures. Indeed, a few years after the WebsterAshburton correspondence in 1845, the United States declared war against Mexico
after Mexican soldiers fired on an American patrol along the disputed border with
Texas.
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The contrast between The Caroline incident and the U.S.
invasion of Iraq could not be more pronounced: first, The Caroline
stands for the principle that a state may resort to force in self-defense
only when there is no time to pursue other diplomatic means for
avoiding an imminent attack. In The Caroline case, the British did
not act on speculation that the United States might attack in the
future. They did not say that there was a "grave and gathering
threat," as President Bush alleged. Rather, they were responding to a
prior overt series of unprovoked armed attacks. Even prior to
learning that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction, the
United States did not allege that an attack on its territory was
imminent. As we now know, Iraq had neither the means nor the
intention of attacking the United States in the foreseeable future.
Despite the fact that the British attack on The Caroline was
preceded by a prior attack on British territory, some authorities read
the incident as support for the idea of anticipatory self-defense. 5 It is
true that 'the' British clearly intended to stop future attacks by
destroying the vessel. However, as discussed above, every act in selfdefense anticipates some future attack, even if a prior attack has
occurred. .Therefore, to focus on the anticipated attacks of The
Caroline and ignore the immediate prior attacks that same day,
distorts the precedent.
The real significance of The Caroline is the requirement that
when force is used in self-defense it must be proportional to the
threat. That is, a state is only justified in using as much force as is
necessary to deter an attack. In The Caroline, the British merely
seized and destroyed a single vessel, which incidentally resulted in the
deaths of two Americans who had participated in the armed attacks
against the British. By contrast, the United States did not merely
destroy a few specific military targets. It launched massive and
sustained attacks on military and civilian sites, invaded and occupied
the entire country, removed its government, disbanded its police and
military, and imposed its own form of government on Iraq. The U.S.
resort to force was neither proportional to the threat nor was it
limited in form or duration. The U.S. attack resulted in thousands of
Iraqi civilian deaths and injuries, the destruction of billions of dollars
of civilian infrastructure and private property, and a total collapse of
law and order.
15. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1633-35 (1982).
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Even if The Caroline does not provide a suitable precedent for
the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it is still possible that other precedents
support the claim that the U.S. invasion was consistent with
customary international law. Specifically, one might argue that the
Israeli attack on Arab forces in 1967, or the Israeli attack on an
Iranian nuclear facility in 1981 constituted evidence that the
international community had accepted as law the right of states to
resort to anticipatory self-defense.
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War was immediately proceeded by
several belligerent measures undertaken by Egypt against Israel.
First, Egypt threatened to attack Israel. Then Egypt ordered U.N.
peace-keeping forces to withdraw from the Sinai. Egypt closed the
Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Next Egypt
mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops and tons of equipment to
Israeli intelligence confirmed Egypt's
the border with Israel.
intention to attack imminently. Large numbers of Palestinian fighters
crossed into Israel from Syria. The Governments of Jordan and Syria
also mobilized troops, and other Arab states, expressed their support
for attacking Israel. Israel was massively outnumbered by Arab
armies pledged to "drive Israel into the sea." Since Israel's founding
the Arab states remained in a state of war with Israel, and Israel had
already fought two costly wars and innumerable skirmishes with the
Arabs. Israeli leaders justifiably worried that unless they struck first,
the momentum of the invading forces could threaten both Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv, where most Israelis live, result in massive casualties,
and sever the country in half. For these reasons, Israel decided to
attack first.
Regardless of how one views the Mideast conflict, a fair-minded
person considering the facts on the ground in 1967 might reasonably
have concluded that if Israel had not struck first, it might not have
survived. Fearing that their country's existence was on the line,
Israeli leaders probably were not worried about whether the situation
16
legally justified the use of force before an armed attack.

16. Even a majority of the International Court of Justice has acknowledged that
when a country's survival is threatened, the prohibition on the use of force without a
prior armed attack might not apply. In an advisory opinion on whether the first-use
of nuclear weapons was prohibited by international law, the World Court stated that
it "cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very
survival of a State would be at stake." Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Use
of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 1996).
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These facts hardly support the application of the Bush Doctrine
in Iraq. Arguably, the Israeli attack was not in anticipation of a
future attack, but, like The Caroline, was in response to the use of
force that had already occurred. The Israeli response to Egypt was
preceded by Egyptian forces occupying the buffer zone with Israel
and blockading Israeli shipping, which could constitute an act of war.
Surely, if Panama barred U.S. shipping from the Panama Canal, the
United States would probably regard that as an act of aggression and
would respond in kind. It would not be necessary for the United
States to wait until the mainland were under attack before it
defended itself.
Even if we accept the view that the Egyptian blockade was not a
prior armed attack, the precedent of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War does
not support the Bush Doctrine as applied in the Iraq War. Unlike the
Arab-Israeli conflict, there was no history of Iraq attacking the
United States. Iraq was not threatening to destroy the United States.
Iraq never posed the kind of imminent threat to the United States, or
its allies, represented by the armies massing on Israel's borders. The
U.S. Government never alleged that Iraq could have threatened the
existence of the United States, and neither the evidence presented
before the Security Council by the U.S. Secretary of State Colin
Powell, nor what we subsequently learned about Iraq's weapons
capacity, suggested that Iraq could do more than inflict casualties on
the United States. If Iraq had possessed chemical weapons at the
time of the U.S. invasion, the threat was never explicit, immediate,
unambiguous, or visible. The United States has claimed that even the
possibility that Iraq intended to develop nuclear weapons at some
future time justified anticipatory self-defense. Clearly, that kind of
speculative threat bears no resemblance to the Israeli situation.
Moreover, it is far from clear that the world community accepted
as law Israel's actions.
In fact, Israel was condemned by Arab and
Soviet-bloc countries for its aggression.
The Security Council
unanimously resolved to demand a cease-fire, but did not single out
Israel for censure." Professor Franck has concluded that the record:
[D]oes not amount to an open-ended endorsement of a general
right to anticipatory self-defense, but it does recognize that, in

17. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 105 (2002).
18. S.C. Res. 234, U.N. Doc. S/RES/234 (1967); S.C. Res. 236, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/236 (1967).
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demonstrable circumstances of extreme necessity, anticipatory selfdefense, may be a legitimate exercise of a state's right to ensure its
survival.' 9

The most we could say is that the international response to Israel's
surprise attack was mixed.
Perhaps the one precedent that best supports the U.S. attack on
Iraq would be Israel's surprise air attack on Iraq's nuclear facilities at
Tuwaitha in 1981. Iraq had not announced an intention of building or
using a nuclear weapon against Israel. However, Iraq was technically
at war with Israel, and Israel claimed that Iraq had the capacity to
The intelligence
become a nuclear power within four years.
supporting the Israeli claim was disputed by both the Government of
Iraq and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 2°
By contrast, the United States acted in a situation in which U.N.
inspectors were aggressively searching for evidence of weapons of
mass destruction and had found none. The United States knew that
chemical weapons had been destroyed during the 1991 Persian Gulf
War and that any chemical weapons still extant would have long ago
lost their toxicity. Moreover, Iraq had since been subjected to
economic sanctions that had strangled Iraq's technical infrastructure
and made it difficult if not impossible for Iraq to replenish its
weapons. Unlike Israel's surgical attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility,
the U.S. attack on Iraq was not limited to the suspected sites where
weapons of mass destruction were being developed or stored.
Indeed, as will be discussed more fully below, the United States acted
based upon inaccurate and incomplete information from biased,
unreliable sources that was contradicted by other sources. The
United States did not even allege that the Iraqi nuclear program had
reached the stage of enrichment. Moreover, the United States caused
massive damage to civilian infrastructure causing large numbers of
civilian casualties, and again, the United States did not content itself
with seizing and destroying weapons, but instead occupied the
country and replaced the government. The U.S. attack was vastly
disproportionate to any hypothetical threat Iraq might have appeared
to pose.
Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility cannot be seen as
evidence in support of the Bush Doctrine. No other country
19.

THOMAS

M.

FRANCK,

RECOURSE

THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 105 (2002).

20.

Id. at 105-07.

TO FORCE:

STATE

ACTION AGAINST
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defended Israel's use of force. Even the U.S. Government rejected
Israel's legal justification. The Security Council unanimously adopted
a resolution criticizing Israel's action. 2 The General Assembly also
passed a resolution condemning Israel that only Israel and the United
States opposed. 2 Professor Franck has suggested that the reason
Israel's claim was rejected had more to do with the questionable
evidence of Iraq's nuclear capability. Professor Franck has written
that:
[E]ven vociferous critics of Israel made clear that they were not
opposed to a right of anticipatory self-defense in principle but,
rather that they did not believe that Iraq's nuclear plant was being
used unlawfully to produce weapons and that a nuclear attack on
Israel was neither probable nor imminent. 3
Professor Franck has left open the possibility that if the evidence
confirmed Israel's supposition, the attack would be justified.
Professor Franck's premise leads to the conclusion that the Israeli air
attack on Iraq's nuclear facility is at best an indeterminate precedent
that neither supports nor contradicts the Bush Doctrine.
Is the Bush Doctrine Creating a New Norm of Customary
International Law?
When states misbehave by disappointing the customary
expectations of other states, they are subject to whatever sanctions
the system imposes. Customary international law evolves continually
as an expression of the considered judgment of humankind.
Governments comply with customary norms out of enlightened selfinterest. Customary international law condemns piracy, protects
foreign nationals when they travel abroad, immunizes diplomats from
arrest, and limits the use of force. These are not merely rules to
constrain states; this is sound practical advice that states ignore at
their peril.
Customary international law evolves over time as state behavior
changes. Each time a state behaves contrary to an existing norm it
creates the possibility of a new norm. Over time rule-breaking can
become rule-making if other states accept the new practice as law.
What may at first appear as a violation of international law by the

21. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981).
22. G.A. Res. 36/27, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/27 (1981).
23. FRANCK, supra note 17, at 108.
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United States, may, in time, create a new precedent.
Some proponents of the Bush Doctrine may acknowledge that
anticipatory self-defense is inconsistent with the Charter, but assert
that the Iraq invasion represents the emergence of a new norm that
modifies or displaces the Charter's limits on the use of force. That
argument raises two questions: first, can a newly emerging customary
norm modify or displace an existing treaty, and second, will the Iraq
invasion be accepted as law?
As to the first issue, it is contestable whether a treaty can be
changed by a new norm of customary international law.24 Customary
international law requires us to determine both whether a practice is
sufficiently general, and whether it is accepted as law (opinio juris).
Only states that consent to a customary norm may be bound by it; in
other words, states may opt out of the norm. It is always arguable
whether states have consented (implicitly or explicitly) to a particular
practice. For example, what would constitute acceptance of the
customary norm of anticipatory self-defense? Would it only be
accepted by states that actually intervened in anticipatory selfdefense? Would it suffice to say that a state publicly supported the
U.S. invasion? Or would it be enough to bind a state to the norm if it
failed to publicly denounce the U.S. invasion? The requirement of
opinio juris is even more slippery: how do states manifest the belief
that they are conforming to a norm out of legal obligation rather than
out of self-interest, diplomatic convenience, comity, domestic politics,
or national security considerations?
These interpretive difficulties in determining what constitutes
customary international law suggest that it is advantageous for states
and jurists to rely on treaties as a preferred source of international
Treaties are generally regarded as a
law whenever possible.
preeminent source of international law.s Article 38 of the Statute of
24. Paul B. Stephan, Courts, the Constitution and Customary InternationalLaw:
The Intellectual Origins of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 33, 44-45, (2003). See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
L. Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of
the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997).
25. H. Lauterpacht, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS VOL. I, 86-87
A subsequent treaty will prevail over
(Cambridge University Press, 1970)].
customary international law, unless the customary international norm constitutes a
peremptory norm ('us cogens). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987), reporter's n.4. Although treaties only bind the
signatory parties, they are often seen as evidence of customary international norms

binding all states. 1

OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW

31-36 (Robert Jennings &
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the International Court of Justice lists the four sources of
international law: first, international conventions or treaties; second,
international custom; third, general principles of law; and fourth,
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists as a "subsidiary means" of determining the law. This list of
international law sources moves from the most specific, explicit and
clearest expression of the will of sovereign states to the least. The
preferred position of international treaty law ahead of international
customary law is consistent with the idea that in interpreting a state's
legal obligations, a court is bound first by the clearest and most
concrete expression of the state's consent.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter
Vienna Convention) recognizes in its preamble "the ever-increasing
importance of treaties as a source of international law." According to
the Vienna Convention, parties to a treaty are only bound by their
consent. It affirms that where there are successive treaties relating to
the same subject-matter, the later treaties only modify an earlier
treaty as between states that are party to both treaties. 6 That is, both
states must manifest their consent to a subsequent treaty, and it is not
enough to merely assert that the subsequent treaty represents a new
norm. 27 The Vienna Convention explicitly provides for amending a
treaty "by agreement between the parties" and any proposal to
amend a multilateral treaty must be notified to all the parties. 28
Moreover, every state party shall have the right to participate in the
amendment and to decide whether to become a party to the amended
agreement. 29 That means that a state cannot be bound to a change in
the treaty without its explicit consent. The only case provided for by
the Vienna Convention in which a treaty might be modified without a
party's explicit consent is if there emerges a new peremptory norm of
general international law or jus cogens.30
Clearly, even the
proponents of the Bush Doctrine are not claiming that it is jus cogens.
Thus, even if the Bush Doctrine represented a new norm of
Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996). Treaties are the "supreme law of the land" under
article VI of the federal Constitution, while customary international law may be seen
as U.S. common law, subordinate to treaties and federal statutes. Id. § 111, cmt. D.
26. Vienna Convenion on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, preamble, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
27. Id. at art. 30.
28. Id. at art. 40.
29. Id. at arts. 39, 40.
30. Id. at art. 64.
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customary international law, it cannot modify or suspend the
obligation of the United States to comply with Article 2(4) of the
Charter, absent the explicit consent of all the parties to the Charter.
Treaties are preferable to international custom as a source of
international law because they are a less ambiguous and more stable
expression of the intentions of the sovereign state parties. Publicists
and jurists are less likely to misunderstand the intent of the sovereign
state when it is expressed in the form of a treaty, and indeed, states
are less inclined to deny the existence of a treaty commitment than
they may be to reject a customary international norm. The principle
of pacta sunt servanda (that parties must carry out their agreements)
is a fundamental constitutive rule of the international system.31 To
the extent that we allow customary international law to modify or
nullify treaty commitments, we introduce a subjective and destabilizing element into the interpretation of international law.
For these reasons, customary international law should be read to
supersede a contrary treaty obligation only if the parties to the treaty
expressly and unambiguously declare their intention to replace the
treaty with the customary rule. As a practical matter, however, it is
hard to see that the parties would on the one hand clearly intend to
displace the treaty without first repudiating it. In all likelihood, the
clearest evidence of an intent to be bound by a newly emerging
customary international norm would be for the parties to repudiate
the treaty. Anything less than repudiating the treaty would evince a
less than clear intention to accept the new customary norm.
With regard to the Bush Doctrine, the other parties to the
Charter would have to manifest an intention to accept the U.S.
invasion of Iraq as representing a new norm of anticipatory selfdefense that modifies Article 2(4) of the Charter. For example, if all,
or most of the parties to the Charter also asserted a right to use force
to preempt future attacks, that might be evidence of a general desire
to modify the Charter. Yet, there is no evidence to support that
contention. In the absence of an expression of intent to modify the
Charter, we must conclude that Article 2(4) continues to prohibit the
use of force without a prior attack.
The second problem raised by the claim that, somehow, the Bush
Doctrine modifies or suspends the Charter, is that we have to satisfy
the requirements of showing that there is a general practice of
anticipatory self-defense and that it is accepted as law.
31. Id. at art. 26.
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As the preceding discussion shows, there are no other clear cases
of anticipatory self-defense that fit the Bush Doctrine: The Caroline
incident followed an ongoing series of attacks on British territory; the
Israeli response to the military build-up on its borders before the 1967
War was more like self-defense than the future-oriented Bush
Doctrine; and although the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactors was
more like the Bush Doctrine, it was unanimously rejected by the
world community. Thus we are left with asserting that the Iraq
invasion is sui generis, rather than representative of a general
practice.
But proponents of the Bush Doctrine could answer that the Iraq
invasion is only the first measure undertaken and that over time as
the Bush Doctrine is employed consistently it will have the desired
effect of displacing Article 2(4) of the Charter. Thus, we are
compelled to look at the second level of inquiry: is the general
practice accepted as law?
While it is admittedly speculative to predict whether future
generations will accept as law the justification for the U.S. invasion of
Iraq, one way to assess that would be to examine the
contemporaneous response of other states. The Bush Administration
proudly points to its "coalition of the willing" as evidence of the
legitimacy of the Iraq invasion. According to the State Department,
some 40-odd states have supported the invasion. These include a few
important allies, including the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland,
Italy, Japan, and Spain. Among these, only the United Kingdom,
Australia, and Poland have committed more than a few hundred
token troops.32 Most of the "coalition" are smaller, developing or
post-communist countries that have no interest in the Middle East,
are heavily dependent upon U.S. aid or trade and cannot provide
military or financial support.
Apparently, the United States
pressured these governments to make some superficial gesture of
support. Included on this list are countries like Latvia, Micronesia,
Moldova, Palau and Tonga.
Of course, the principle of sovereign equality might suggest that
in judging the extent to which a customary practice is accepted as law,
each state's consent is weighed equally. Palau's approval is just as
important as Egypt's disapproval. However, even by that measure,
32. Indeed, the number of private contractors serving in Iraq now far exceeds the
number of troops deployed by any of our allies. It could be said that the principal
ally of the U.S. forces in Iraq is literally the private sector.
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the United States claims that only about one-fifth of the 191 member
states of the United Nations has expressed support for the U.S.
occupation. One might also question whether the acceptance of such
states is entirely voluntary. In a situation in which the Bush
Administration has stated that any country that is not with us is
against us, it is clear that smaller states had better shut up or else.
More importantly, most of the rest of the world, including most
of our NATO allies, three of the five permanent members of the
Security Council (France, Germany and Russia), and the entire Arab
world have condemned our actions.
Even among supportive
countries like the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, public opinion
has run strongly against the United States and the invasion of Iraq.33
Spain's ruling party was defeated by the Socialists based in large
part
4
on the Socialists' opposition to Spanish intervention in Iraq.
Public opinion, however, ebbs and flows, and alliances shift over
time. Perhaps if the violence in Iraq abates, other governments will
be more willing to participate in the work of reconstruction (and gain
a share in the profitable reconstruction contracts for their nationals).
Germany, for example, has indicated an interest in bidding on
reconstruction contracts. The U.N. Security Council has recognized
the authority of the provisional council established by the United
33. A Pew Research Center Survey reported that the percentages of the
following countries' populations that opposed the U.S. military action during the
period immediately preceding the invasion were Britain (51%), Italy (81%), Spain
(81%), Poland (73%), France (75%), Germany (69%), Russia (87%) and Turkey
(86%). Pew Research Center, American Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want
Weaker
Ties (Mar.
18,
2003),
at
1, available
at
<http://peoplepress.org/reports/print.php3?PagelD=680>.
Following the U.S invasion, another Pew poll of 16,000 in twenty-one countries
was released on June 3, 2003. Both among traditional allies and Muslim countries,
support for the United States fell as a result of the invasion. Favorable views of the
United States fell from 78% to 45% in Germany, 62% to 43% in France, 76% to
60% in Italy, 61% to 15% in Indonesia and from 71% to 38% in Nigeria. Pew
Research Center, War with Iraq Further Divides Global Publics (June 3, 2003), at 19,
available at <http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PagelD=712>.
A more recent Pew poll found a large majority in each of eight foreign countries
surveyed has unfavorable views of President Bush. Bush's unfavorable ratings
ranged from 57% (Britain) to 96% (Jordan), with Russia (60%), Pakistan (67%),
Turkey (67%), France (85%), Germany (85%) and Morocco (90%) in between. Pew
Global Project Attitudes, Mistrust of America in Europe Ever Higher, Muslim Anger
Persists
(Mar.
16,
2004),
at
21,
available
at
<http://peoplepress.org/reports/print.php3?PagelD=795>.
34. Lizette Alvarez & Elain Sciolino, Bombings in Madrid: Election Outcome;
Spain Grapples with Notion that Terrorism Trumped Democracy, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
17, 2004, at Al.
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States35 and has endorsed the Interim Government of Iraq that
assumed responsibility on June 30.6
The endorsement of the Interim Government was not intended
as an endorsement of the U.S. invasion or occupation, however. The
Security Council provided that U.S. forces could remain in Iraq "at
the request of the incoming Interim Government" and that the
mandate of the U.S. forces would terminate if requested by the
Interim Government, or in any event by December 31, 2005, when a
permanent government takes office.
If the U.S. Invasion Gains Legitimacy in this Way,
Does It Mean that the Bush Doctrine Will Eventually Be
Accepted as Law?
Assessing the Bush Doctrine by the diplomatic response of states
and the reaction of world public opinion to the Iraq invasion, may
miss the more fundamental issue: the United States claimed that the
invasion was necessary to preempt Iraq from using its weapons of
mass destruction; we now know that there is no evidence that such
weapons ever existed. The U.S. Iraq Survey Group, led by David
Kay, confirmed the findings of the earlier visits by U.N. inspectors
that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction at the time the
United States invaded.37 This finding is consistent with the public
statements of the Iraqi Government and evidence gathered by U.S.
and allied intelligence services prior to the U.S. invasion, as well as
the statements by Iraqi officials and scientists following the
occupation.
The evidence that supported the President's conclusion was38
presented by Secretary of State Powell to the U.N. Security Council.
That evidence included a contract for the purchase of uranium from
Niger, photographs of mobile units believed to be used to
manufacture biological weapons, aluminum tubes allegedly purchased
by Iraq to be used to build centrifuges for uranium enrichment and
35. S.C. Res. 1518, U.N. SCOR, 4872nd mtg (2003).
36. S.C. Res. 1546, June 8, 2004 (adopted 15-0).
37. Transcript: David Kay at Senate Hearing, CNN, Jan. 28, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). David
Kay testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee [first week in February, 2004]
that "We were all wrong." He told the Committee that with 85% of the Survey
Group's work completed, it was likely that no weapons would be discovered.
38. See Threats and Responses; Powell's Address, Presenting 'Deeply Troubling'
Evidence on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A18.
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statements from Iraqi defectors, among other things. The contract
was immediately identified as a bad forgery, and the Secretary later
withdrew that evidence. The photographs did not actually reveal the
manufacture of weapons. The information that these were weapons
facilities came from statements made by Iraqi defectors who claimed
that they had knowledge of these facilities. 39 The Iraqi defectors were
later identified as agents of the Iraqi National Congress organized by
Ahmad Chalibi, who worked closely with the Bush Administration in
the planning for the war and who has both economic and political
interests in bringing down the Hussein regime. 4°
The U.S.
Department of Energy's own nuclear scientists advised the State
Department that the aluminum tubes could not be used to build
centrifuges.41 In other words, the United States relied upon evidence
that was42largely forged, misleading or based upon unreliable partisan
sources.

As Professor Franck has pointed out, one of the most
remarkable aspects of the Bush Doctrine is its unilateralism. The
Bush Doctrine would empower the United States (or presumably any
other state) to determine the existence of a threat and a necessity for
preemption, then to act without any check on their judgment. The
Bush Doctrine does not require the United States to persuade any
other states that the evidence it relies upon is valid or persuasive.
The fact that the United States actually had no valid evidence
supporting its invasion is surely a relevant fact in assessing the
legitimacy of the Doctrine. Moreover, even if the rest of the world
responded enthusiastically to the Iraq invasion, we would have to
assess the evidence of a "grave and gathering threat" before we could
conclude that the invasion was justifiable because the threat was real
and preemption was necessary. In this instance, the threat was not
39. The conclusion that the trailers were used to produce biological weapons was
based upon human intelligence reports. Since the war, most intelligence analysts
have concluded that the trailers were used to make hydrogen for weather balloons.
Douglas Jehl, The Strugglefor Iraq: Weapons, US., Certain that Iraq had Illicit Arms,
Reportedly Ignored Contrary Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A6.

40. Ahmad Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress funneled defectors to the press,
which reported claims of clandestine weapons programs. These claims, often
disputed by CIA analysts, nevertheless got picked up by the Pentagon's intel shop,
which passed them on to the White House. John Barry & Mark Hosenball, What
Went Wrong, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2004, at 30. See generally Jane Mayer, The
Manipulator,THE NEW YORKER, June 7, 2004, at 58-72.
41. See Mayer, supra note 39.
42. See Douglas Jehl & David E. Sanger, Powell's Case, a Year Later: Gaps in
Pictureof Iraqi Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004, at Al.
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real, and preemption was not necessary, so that even if future
generations conclude that the American invasion was justifiable, it
will have to be for some reason other than the Bush Doctrine.
If at some future time new evidence is produced that Iraq
actually did possess biological weapons, would that be sufficient for
the Bush Doctrine to be accepted as law? Would the discovery that
weapons of mass destruction existed in Iraq retroactively justify the
preemptive use of force?
That depends in part on whether the world community can be
persuaded that the President acted in good faith when he authorized
the invasion of Iraq. So far, the evidence of bad faith is only
circumstantial, but collectively this evidence seems more persuasive
than the evidence that the United States possessed of the existence of
weapons of mass destruction.43 First, we know that the Bush
Administration discussed "regime change" in Iraq as a foreign policy
priority, and that members of the Bush Administration, including
Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, had discussed and
published arguments for invading Iraq at least as early as 1998. 44 We
also know that Vice-President Cheney was the leading voice in
support of an invasion and that, within a few days of the President's
inauguration, the President's Cabinet discussed using military force to
remove the Government of Iraq.4 All of this planning took place in
2001 prior to either the attack on the World Trade Center or the
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate, which had asserted that
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.4
We know that at the time the United States was planning its
invasion of Iraq, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had advised
the President that the evidence of weapons of mass destruction was
contradicted.47 The President and his advisers rejected contradictory
43. Even President Bush has privately acknowledged misgivings about the
evidence of weapons of mass destruction. BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 247-50
(2004).
44. Bill Keller, The Sunshine Warrior,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, § 4 (Magazine),
at 48. See also Alan Brinkley, Battle Formation, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2004, at T67.
45. 60 Minutes: Bush Sought 'Way' To Invade Iraq? (CBS television broadcast.
Jan. 11, 2004).
46. John Barry & Mark Hosenball, What Went Wrong, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2004,
at 27. RICHARD A. CLARKE, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES 264-66 (2004).
47. George Tenet, Address at Georgetown University (Feb. 5, 2004), in Federal
News Service, Remarks by CIA DirectorGeorge Tenet Re: U.S. Intelligence Gathering
and Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Program,available at <www.fnsg.com>.
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evidence and relied instead on evidence that supported 48their
conclusion that Iraq represented a "grave and gathering threat."
We know that prior to the invasion the Army Corp of Engineers
signed a secret, non-competitive contract with the Halliburton
Corporation for more than $1 billion to provide services for the
invasion. Given that Vice-President Cheney was the former CEO of
Halliburton, that he receives annual compensation from Halliburton
estimated at $300,000 and that the Vice-President holds millions of
dollars in Halliburton stock options in a blind trust, this contract
raises questions of conflicts of interest.4 9 Those questions are
compounded by the fact that the World Trade Organization's
Agreement on Government Procurement and the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act require the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers to solicit
bids for contracts according to a transparent and non-discriminatory
procedure. Neither the Government Procurement Agreement nor
U.S. statutory law were followed. In other words, the contracts
offered to the Halliburton Corporation were probably illegal both
under U.S. statutory law and international treaty law. After the
invasion the Bush Administration continued the practice of offering
billions of dollars in contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq to a few
favored U.S. corporations with close ties to the Administration in
violation of our international agreement and federal law. These facts
in themselves call into question the motives for the U.S. invasion and
occupation.
Further, we know that when Ambassador Joseph Wilson III
advised the Administration that the evidence that Niger had sold
uranium to Iraq was fraudulent, based upon his own secret contacts
with the Government of Niger, his information was dismissed."
When he went public with his claims, someone in the Administration,
in violation of federal law, disclosed to journalists that Ambassador
Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, was a CIA agent.52 Apparently, the
48. Douglas Jehl, U.S., Certain That Iraq Had Illicit Arms, Reportedly Ignored
Contrary Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2004, at A6 (citing a senior government
official involved in planning the war who said, "human intelligence wasn't deemed
interesting or useful if it was exculpatory of Iraq.").
49. See Jane Mayer, Contract Sport: What did the Vice-President do for
Halliburton?,THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 16 & 23, 2004.
50. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3511 et seq. (2004); WTO
Agreement on Government Procurement, Annex I.
51. Joseph C. Wilson, What I Didn't Find in Africa, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2003, § 4
(Magazine), at 9.
52. Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C.S. § 3. et seq.
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disclosure was intended to silence Wilson and others who might
challenge the Administration's case for going to war. When the
White House learned that this felony had occurred, it initially did
nothing to identify who in the executive branch was responsible for
trying to intimidate this man by endangering the life of his spouse.
While a special prosecutor is now examining the violation of federal
law that prohibits anyone from identifying a CIA agent, the incident
suggests that at least some members of the Administration were
aware that the argument for preemption was weaker than it
appeared, and they were prepared to violate the law in order to
prevent the public from learning about contradictory evidence.
Taken together, this evidence, albeit circumstantial, suggests that
the Administration may not have been truthful in arguing for a
preemptive strike to remove weapons of mass destruction from Iraq.
Whether the President misrepresented or exaggerated the threat
posed by Iraq, is not clear. Perhaps, over time, we will learn more to
support or contradict the Administration's argument. Only Congress
can compel the President to answer the two most relevant questions,
"What didn't the President know, and when didn't he know it?" The
point is that if the Administration later turns out to be right about
weapons of mass destruction, but its motives were questionable, then
it will not contribute to legitimating the Bush Doctrine.
Given this information, it seems doubtful that the world
community will reach the conclusion that our attack was justifiable to
preempt the use of non-existent weapons. If it turns out that the
President lied in asserting that Iraq possessed weapons of mass
destruction, then the doctrine of preemption is no more plausible in
justifying the U.S. invasion of Iraq than it would be in justifying
Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality in 1914. There may be
other reasons for justifying the U.S. attack on Iraq, such as
establishing a democracy, ending human rights abuses, or
transforming the geopolitical situation in the Middle East. None of
these reasons, however, corresponds to the Bush Doctrine of
preemption, and therefore, even if they may be compelling
arguments, we cannot test the legitimacy of the Bush Doctrine as
international law against these alternative arguments for invasion.

(2004).
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Conclusion
If the United States had complied with the existing rules of
international law, it would have delayed its attack on Iraq until the
Security Council was persuaded that an attack would be necessary to
remove the threat posed by Iraq. If the United States had waited, it is
possible that the U.N. inspectors might have found evidence of
weapons or evidence that the weapons were destroyed. We now
know that the United States would not have risked an attack by
waiting. It is unlikely, but possible, that internal forces within Iraq
might have brought down Saddam Hussein or that he could have
been persuaded to leave. It is likely that in time the Security Council
might have authorized military force under a U.N. flag. In that case,
the burden of the war and the occupation, both in terms of casualties
and expense, would have been shared. The imprimatur of the United
Nations would have reduced the risk of retaliatory strikes against U.S.
troops and civilians and hastened the establishment of a legitimate
government in Iraq. In short, if the United States had waited for the
Security Council to act, the United States and the Middle East would
be more secure today than we are.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq has exposed the hubris that underlies
the Bush Doctrine. One hopes that the tragic experience of this war
will be a lesson to future leaders in the moral and practical
advantages of relying on international law and institutions rather than
unilateral force.

